Diplomatic and Legal Challenges to the Historic Legacies of Japan\u27s Territorial Disputes by Ikeshima Taisaku
155
Transcommunication  Vol.?-?  Fall ????
Graduate School of International Culture and Communication Studies
Article
Diplomatic and Legal Challenges to the 
Historic Legacies of Japan’s Territorial Disputes? 
Taisaku Ikeshima?
Abstract
Territorial disputes are multi-faceted products of long-standing state-state relationships involving 
the historic and cultural legacies of the parties concerned. Japan faces the following long-standing 
territorial disputes with its neighbouring states: (?) the Northern Territories dispute with Russia; (?) 
the Takeshima/Dokdo dispute with the Republic of Korea (or South Korea); and (?) the Senkaku/
Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai Islands dispute with the People’s Republic of China (or China) and possibly 
the Republic of China (or Taiwan). Essentially, each case has its origin sometime before the Second 
World War, and the difficulties in settling these disputes arise from the fact that the post-war situation 
as well as the Cold War has made their settlement more complicated with regard to the interpretation 
and application of the relevant rules of international law. This article aims to propose some alternatives 
for future approaches to these issues by referencing successful precedence in this field and practical 
challenges in the application and interpretation of the legal rules of diplomacy in international society.
Key words:  Japan’s territorial disputes, Northern Territories, Takeshima / Dokdo, Senkaku Islands / 
Diaoyudao / Diaoyutai, boundaries, maritime space
Introduction
Territory is one of the most important elements that make a sovereign state. Territorial disputes are 
multi-faceted products of long-standing state-state relationships involving the historic and cultural 
legacies of the parties concerned.? Territorial disputes may, in general, attract the attention of not 
only the parties concerned but also third states, because the latter can learn from the former’s 
responses to the questions involved. When a territorial dispute is successfully settled, the solution 
is of great value as good precedence. One cannot always expect a solution of the all-or-nothing 
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style. In some cases, the solution may partially satisfy both parties. Additionally, neither party 
may be satisfied even though a legally sound answer to the problem is provided in the form of an 
arbitral award? or judicial decision.
As the attached map shows, Japan has three 
territorial disputes with neighbouring states: (?) over the 
Northern Territories with Russia; (?) over Takeshima/
Dokdo with the Republic of Korea (or South Korea); 
and (?) over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai Islands 
with the People’s Republic of China (and, possibly, 
with the Republic of China (or Taiwan)).? Essentially, 
each case has its origin sometime before the Second World War, and the difficulties in settling 
these disputes arise from the fact that the post-war situation as well as the Cold War has made their 
settlement more complicated with regard to the interpretation and application of the relevant rules 
of international law. Japan’s foreign policy should be pursued on the basis of this understanding.?
The location of these islands denotes the political, economic, historic, geopolitical, and 
cultural elements concerning the bilateral relations between the parties concerned. However, these 
elements tend to obstruct peaceful and smooth communication between the parties. The matter 
of territory naturally stirs up nationalism among the people due to their emotional and subjective 
bonds with the land. Diplomacy and foreign policy are supposed to function in accordance with 
international law. It is often neglected that, under these circumstances, international law will not 
necessarily be the one and only panacea for a territorial dispute.
The aim of this article is to reconsider the often neglected points regarding the settlement 
of Japan’s territorial disputes with its neighbouring states, and aims to provide a fresh look at the 
territorial issues that may often misguide and blind the parties concerned. The article does not 
intend to present any practical method to settle these disputes. Its main argument is to show the 
following. First, one cannot perfectly settle territorial disputes only through a diplomatic or legal 
means. It is rather rare in practice to win one-sidedly in diplomacy. It may even be unfavourable to 
demand ???% of a goal in the near future, and it may be wiser to modestly stop short of more than 
half of the final goal.? Second, legal principles and rules may play limited roles in the settlement 
of disputes in international politics. Third, statesmen, diplomats and practitioners need courage 
and imagination to embark on a new phase in diplomatic negotiations. This article will supply a 
different point of view concerning the settlement of territorial disputes and the role that law has to 
play in this field. 
I. Japan’s territorial disputes: The Three Cases
As the attached table shows (see 【Table】), these three disputes are quite different from 
Source: Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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each other in their backgrounds, the nature of the dispute, geographical elements, the political 
and economic connotations, and so on. But, at the same time, these disputes seem to have some 
common features such as physical and geopolitical conditions, and economic utility. The islands 
are located in a geopolitically sensitive area between these parties.? They may also have an 
economic potential upon the condition that they are properly developed. When the parties agree on 
these considerations, it may positively accelerate the future of the settlement of the disputes.
1. The Northern Territories?
The Northern Territories are a set of four islands (Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and 
Habomai). According to the Japanese government, they have been under ‘illegal’ occupation 
by Russia (and the former Soviet Union) since the end of the Second World War. Japan wishes 
to solve this territorial issue since the conclusion of a peace treaty to establish a real strategic 
partnership will be of great interest to both countries. Even though its detailed legal argument 
is not necessarily clear, Russia’s position?? may be summarized as follows: (?) All of the Kuril 
Islands, including the four islands in question, became part of Russia as a result of the Second 
World War; (?) Russia, or its predecessor state, the former Soviet Union, has unquestionable 
territorial sovereignty over the Islands under relevant international agreements. For Russia, thus, it 
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is Japan which must accept the consequences of the Second World War.
Japan’s position is mostly based on the following arguments: (?) The four islands in 
question are inherent territories of Japan; (?) these islands have been illegally occupied by the 
former Soviet Union and Russia since the end of the Second World War; and (?) the international 
agreements, on which Russia relies, are not applicable to this territorial dispute.??
Regarding its legal argument, Japan seeks to base its claim on the ???? Atlantic Charter, 
which committed the US and the UK, later with accession by the former Soviet Union, to the 
principle of ‘non-territorial expansion by war’. Then, for Japan, the four islands, which are 
inherently part of its territory, are not included in the territories that it was stripped of, under the 
???? Cairo Declaration,?? in contrast to those Japan had seized ‘by violence and greed’. The ???? 
Yalta Agreement,?? between American, British and Soviet leaders, stipulates that ‘[t]he Kurile 
Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union’, but Japan maintains that its legal nature does 
not justify Russia’s claim due to its inapplicability to a third state of the agreement.??
In Japan’s opinion, the Potsdam Declaration,?? which reconfirmed the Cairo Declaration, 
does not apply to the four islands either, since they are not part of the territories that Japan was 
forced to renounce. Even the partial nature of peace in the ???? San Francisco Peace Treaty made 
the situation more complicated, because, under the Peace Treaty, of which Russia is not a state 
party,?? the range of the Kurile Islands, all the titles, rights, and claims to which were renounced 
by Japan,?? has remained a very controversial issue to both countries. In short, the origin of the 
dispute derives both from the obscurity of the disposition of the post-war settlement and from 
the unreliable attitude of the drafters and authors of each arrangement, who left matters in the 
hands of others, perhaps due to the lack of time in the post-war confusion period and an optimistic 
perspective.
It is also unfortunate that, historically, both sides have only harboured animosity towards 
one another, owing to the sour and negative impressions of one another that has been prevalent 
for nearly a century. Russia, who used to be one of the largest imperial powers, does not like to 
remember the defeat of the Russo-Japanese War of ????-??, or the pains it felt against Japan’s troops 
sent to Siberia during its weak and messy domestic period after the Russian revolution. Japan also 
has a bitter memory of the Triple Intervention (of Russia, France, and Germany) after the ???? 
Treaty of Shimonoseki, and the treacherous Soviet participation in the Pacific War despite the 
existence of the ???? Neutrality Pact between the two countries.
Moreover, one of the most confusing issues concerning the territorial dispute is the range 
of the Kurile Islands. The geographical and legal scope of these disputed islands has been 
controversial due to the awkward and twisted history of the position of both parties. Did Japan 
renounce all the islands in this range? It is not very well known, despite the debate session at 
the Diet of Japan after the Second World War, that Etorofu and Kunashiri were, at first, regarded 
as being out of the scope of the ‘inherent territory of Japan’, and that they were purported to 
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constitute part of the Kurile Islands that Japan had renounced after the San Francisco Peace Treaty.
It has been pointed out, moreover, that during the negotiation of the conclusion of a Joint 
Declaration in the mid-????s, Japan, whose domestic political environment was considerably 
unstable at the time, switched its policy to the reversion of the four islands from the original 
modest return of the two. This was done under the threat of the then Secretary of State Allen 
Welsh Dulles, who wanted to make the most of the Cold War situation in the Far East. This story, 
which was disclosed in detail in Shunichi Matsumoto’s Mosukuwa ni kakeru niji (Rainbow over 
Moscow),?? has been, curiously, denied as ‘a mistake or a misunderstanding’ by the Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who insists on its ‘consistent’ grounds toward the return of all four 
islands in its entirety.
However, the ???? Joint Declaration only mentions the possibility to ‘hand over’ the two 
minor islands, Shikotan and Habomai, after the conclusion of a peace treaty, without referring to 
the other two.?? For the last ?? years, little progress has been made concerning this territorial issue, 
which has been clinging to the dialogue between Japan and Russia. Even after the end of the Cold 
War, summits between the two countries have borne very little fruit, with some exceptions: first, 
a group consisting of a lawmaker, a high bureaucrat, and their colleagues developed a remarkably 
friendly atmosphere in the disputed area which unfortunately led to some scandals; and second, 
the aforementioned European Parliament resolution, which, as far as this dispute is concerned, 
clearly supports Japan’s position.?? 
Thanks to the new initiative by the Abe administration in cooperation with the Putin 
presidency, the recent trade and economic relationship has started to grow gradually since the 
end of ????, and the energy project between the two is currently regarded as hopeful. Many 
approaches have been advocated by the leaders of both countries such as a ‘new, creative, non-
stereotype approach’ (Taro Aso, quoting the then President Dmitry Medvedev), ‘hikiwake (or 
draw)’ (President Vladimir Putin), and ‘a mutually acceptable solution’ (Medvedev and Putin). In 
other words, one may say that there will never be a one-sided solution, no matter how desperately 
Japan wishes to insist on a solution ‘on the basis of historical and legal facts’ on the one hand, and 
‘on the principles of law and justice’ on the other. Russia will not agree to hand over the islands 
in question because there is a possibility that the United State will eventually take them over from 
Japan in order to install its military base and facilities aiming at maintaining security in the region. 
The recent proposal of introducing some joint economic activities (projects)?? under a ‘special 
legal regime’ established by the two countries is still under consideration for the future.
Are the facts and legal rules applied in this dispute clear and without question to everybody? 
Does law give both sides a clear indication of the attribution of sovereignty in this issue? Does this 
type of negotiation led by an adversarial attitude produce ‘a mutually acceptable solution’ in the 
long term? It seems that the sort of ‘zero-sum’ game nature of the territorial dispute in accordance 
with relevant laws will limit the future of conversation in international society where there is no 
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supra national existence that can effectively persuade the parties concerned, and where there is no 
legal obligation to bring a dispute to a court or a tribunal without both parties’ consent.
2. Takeshima/Dokdo Dispute??
The next is the singular situation of Takeshima/Dokdo.?? In the light of Article ??? (Régime 
of islands) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), its geographical 
features, such as the mountainous and barren surface of the island, do not seem to support the idea 
that human beings can permanently inhabit it.?? Therefore, this paper does not intend to fully deal 
with the legal status of Takeshima itself, that is, whether it is an island under UNCLOS or not.
The dispute attracted the attention of the Japanese people when the Republic of Korea (ROK) 
suddenly incorporated the island into its own territory in ???? by unilaterally setting the so-called 
Syngman Rhee Line?? after the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, to which Korea 
had not been invited to accede. The ROK has effectively occupied the island since ????, and has 
tried hard to enhance its claim over the territory, for instance by installing permanent facilities 
and security personnel, issuing stamps with a map and picture of the island, and even permitting a 
couple to permanently reside there. 
While the ROK has been intensively solidifying its claim by these kinds of fait accompli, 
Japan denies all of these conducts as valid legal facts to support the Korean claim. Today the 
economic value of the island may be increasing because of the increasing potential for the 
establishment of an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the relevant maritime area around the 
island despite the fact that these two countries have so far avoided any direct clash by concluding 
the ???? bilateral agreement on fisheries.??
Korea’s basic position is that since ‘Dokdo is an integral part of Korean territory, 
historically, geographically and under international law’, ‘[n]o territorial dispute exists’.?? Other 
grounds can be summarised as follows: (?) Korea originally discovered the island, and has 
administered it and maintained a presence on it; (?) Japan’s illegal occupation of the Korean 
Peninsula through its colonial rule does not produce any effective legal title over the island. 
Japan’s position is essentially the following: (?) Takeshima is clearly an inherent territory 
of Japan in the light of historical facts and under international law; (?) Korea, who is illegally 
occupying the island in question, has not produced any effective evidence to support its own 
claims.??
Be that as it may, who can decide the credibility and validity of the maps offered by both 
sides? Some of the maps date back more than a few centuries. At least, the ROK, denying the 
validity of all the evidence that is produced by Japan, has gone so far as to maintain that there is no 
territorial dispute over the island between the two countries because it has been continuously and 
legally occupying the territory as an inherent part of its own. Japan’s position is criticised since 
some writers maintain that the ???? incorporation by Japan of Takeshima into its own territory 
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took place through the process of Japan’s colonization of Korea by way of unequal and illegal 
treaties. This is why the dispute is very often connected to the problem of history recognition 
(including, of late, the comfort women issue) in Korea and reminds the Korean people of the 
unbearable past of the pre-WWII period.
Neither side ever concedes, maintaining that no claim is valid or just. Questions over who 
discovered the island first and when the occupation started have effectively found no common 
answer. Accordingly, it seems to be extremely difficult to settle the dispute through bilateral 
negotiation. Japan’s proposals of ???? and ????, respectively, to jointly file this case at the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) have not been successful in convincing the ROK to join them 
in their proposal.??
In this dispute, however, both governments seem to be making an effort not to fuel the 
peoples on both sides, although there have occasionally been some minor conflicts over the island, 
such as the abrupt visit to the island by the then President Lee Myung-bak in August ????.?? 
Otherwise, however, they tend to be realistic and quite business-like when they have to solve 
practical matters such as fishery problems in and around the maritime zones of the island. When 
Japan normalised diplomatic relations with the ROK through the Basic Treaty of ????, both states 
also concluded the Fishery Agreement to govern fishery matters without settling the Takeshima 
dispute. However, the new Fishery Agreement of ????, which demarcated the lines of the EEZ of 
both countries in the Sea of Japan in accordance with the median line method, sets the temporary 
maritime zone, avoiding delimiting the EEZ of the maritime area around Takeshima, so that 
both sides may exercise their respective enforcement jurisdiction in case of illegal fishing. It is 
noteworthy that, at least with respect to the conclusion of the ???? fishery treaty, they agreed upon 
shelving the question of the attribution of sovereignty over the island, and consented that they 
somehow jointly rule the EEZ regime in the maritime area of the disputed island.
In addition, neither of the two parties doubts the legal status of Takeshima as an ‘island’ but 
not as a rock ‘which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own’ under Article 
???(?) of UNCLOS: Takeshima cannot be a rock for either of them. Otherwise, they would not be 
allowed under UNCLOS to claim the EEZ or continental shelf. Only an island may serve as the 
baseline both for the territorial sea and the contiguous zone, and for the EEZ and the continental 
shelf under Article ???(?) of UNCLOS. 
However, a question arises as to Takeshima’s practical use apart from the symbolical 
geographic indicator to occupy a certain maritime area for jurisdictional control, taking into 
consideration factors such as size and habitability. It is in a sense understandable that an unofficial 
proposal was once made by both sides that the island is so useless that it should be exploded for 
the sake of common peace. So far, no concrete and tangible data is in favour of the very hopeful 
possibility of the development of mineral resources in the maritime zone around the island. The 
major issue may be the exercise of jurisdiction of each country in the relevant maritime area, 
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particularly in case of fishery, maritime safety, and security. In this sense, there seems to be a 
limited number of urgent matters to be resolved between the two countries only if they mutually 
agree upon the solution of shelving the territorial problem for the sake of the practical issues to be 
solved.
3. The Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai Islands Dispute??
The Senkaku/Diaoyudao Islands,?? which are composed of Uotsurijima (?.??? ) and some 
other islets, did not catch the spotlight until the late ????s, when a scientific report made under a 
UN affiliated organ’s initiative revealed the potential existence of a reservoir of non-renewable 
resources under the continental shelf below the maritime area around the islands. Both the People’s 
Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan)?? made a claim for the islands, after the US 
expressed in ???? its intention to return the Okinawa Islands to Japan.??
Regarding the Senkaku Islands issue, the Japanese Government’s position?? is simple, 
compared with the other two territories considered above. When referencing to the official website 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the islands are ‘clearly an inherent part of’ its territory, 
there exists ‘no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved’.?? This seems to be mainly because, 
in contrast to the other two territorial disputes, Japan has effectively occupied the islands since the 
reversion of Okinawa to Japan in the early ????s (that is, the ???? conclusion of the Agreement 
on the Reversion of the Okinawa and the ???? implementation of its reversion).
China’s basic position is that ‘Diaoyu islands belong to China’,?? and is based on history 
and international law (the ???? Cairo Declaration and the ???? Potsdam Proclamation, among 
others).?? China’s claim may be summarised as follows: (?) China has an earlier relation with the 
islands (since the Ming Dynasty (????-????)); (?) the islands were ceded with Taiwan to Japan 
under an unequal treaty in ????, and were returned to China along with Taiwan after the Second 
World War; and (?) just before the reversion by the US of the Okinawa Islands to Japan, China 
protested, claiming its sovereignty over the islands.
Japan, for its part, maintains as follows: (?) Japan occupied terra nullius in ????, and after a 
thorough survey of the islands, incorporated it into its own territory, before Taiwan was ceded by 
China under the ???? Shimonoseki Treaty; and (?) the islands are not included in the territory that 
Japan renounced under Article II of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.
As is also the case with the other two disputes considered above, the main legal issues are 
the following: (?) who originally discovered the islands?; (?) since when have the islands been 
under effective occupation and by which authorities?; (?) the questions over the validity of the 
incorporation of the islands by Japan in ???? under the cover of their victor in the Sino-Japanese 
War; and (?) the question concerning the validity of the disposition of the islands after WWII. 
In this dispute, Japan’s position may appear to be stronger as it ‘effectively’ occupies the 
territories. But, occasionally, it is reported that the ‘trespassing’ in the territorial sea, frequently 
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by Chinese and Taiwanese vessels, official or private, takes place in and around the concerned 
maritime area. Moreover, this territorial issue is quite often connected to the maritime dispute 
concerning the development of gas fields lying across the possible border of the continental shelf 
on each side. 
And, with regards to the delimitation of the continental shelf and the EEZ in the East China 
Sea, China seems to have a policy of ambiguity. And it is often said that China is of the opinion 
that the natural prolongation of its land mass continuously extends beneath the sea beyond the 
median line between the coasts of both sides, which contended by Japan, and even reaches the 
Okinawa Trough, which is located on the Pacific Ocean side. China, as a rising economic power 
in the world, does not only hide its energy resource incentives in the maritime dispute, but also 
shows off its military presence and expansion in the region in order to challenge the current legal 
order established after the Second World War.
China has unilaterally started the exploration and development of gas fields in the area, 
but this has been seen as hostile and unfriendly conduct, set against aforementioned background. 
A partial and tentative agreement made in ???? between the two countries concerning a future 
project of joint development in the area has been adrift, owing to some unexpected events such as 
China’s abrupt drilling in one of the agreed areas. The tentative cease-fire by way of an agreement 
concerning the future joint project has turned out to be a ‘castle in the air’, instead reviving the 
tension between the two sides. While China’s high-ranking officials have expressed their wishes to 
solve the territorial question of the islands through talks, the Japanese side has repeated their very 
firm original position, stating that ‘there was no room for consultation on the territorial question of 
the Senkaku Islands since they are an inherent part of Japan’s territory’. 
Probably the worst tension was caused in ???? by a series of incidents triggered by a 
statement given by the then Tokyo Mayor, Shintaro Ishihara, to the effect that the metropolitan 
government of Tokyo is planning to purchase some of the islets which had been under the 
ownership of a private Japanese citizen. The central government of Japan instead pre-emptively 
‘nationalized’ them by changing the ownership from that of private to that of public. China, for its 
part, regards the unilateral nationalization by Japan of the islands in question as an act of state, and 
a fundamental change to the status quo by breaching the tacit agreement of shelving the dispute, 
whose existence the Japanese government utterly denies.??
A series of conflicts concerning the territory in question may make the Japanese people feel 
that Japan should show its own resolute stance towards the arrogant and unreasonable attitudes 
of the other parties, because Japan has legally justifiable grounds. But is it really so? Who is 
responsible for the task of fact-finding, for example? Do legally justifiable grounds always lead 
to the settlement of disputes? Unfortunately, international law does not necessarily prescribe so. 
It is ironic that history shows some contradictory cases, as will be discussed below. In fact, an 
adversarial and antagonistic atmosphere in a bilateral talk, mainly based on legal claims, only 
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produces a very limited scope of achievements. Legal arguments of this kind without a reliable 
fact-finding process tend to be too barren and futile to bear the fruit of the peaceful settlement of 
a dispute. Beating the opponent hollow by means of legal principles is not a short cut to reaching 
a ‘mutually acceptable solution’. Where there is no third party with an impartial and objective 
character, the battery of legal arguments will per se produce no fruit.
One may often be tempted to propose to have recourse to a judicial and/or arbitral court to 
obtain a final judgment/award. Even though this idea may theoretically be possible under consent 
from the concerned parties, optimistic outcomes are not always guaranteed. There is not as much 
predictability in judicial or arbitral settlements as is often hoped for. There are ample cases that 
attest to the risk and danger of having major recourse to law and legal principles in the settlement 
of territorial disputes. 
II. Some Lessons from Successful Precedence
Owing to the space constraint of this article, it will be of interest to pick only a few relevant 
cases from which we can learn good lessons to use in other approaches to embark on a new phase 
of bilateral relations. It is intriguing to know from these cases that some of them, where the parties 
resorted too heavily to a judicial or arbitral settlement, are probably failures, and that the others 
that may teach us something, are those which contain a non-juridical or more political solution to 
the disputes.
1. The Beagle Channel Case??
First, in the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile, the issue was the 
demarcation of the border lines delimiting the land and maritime zones over which both states 
claim sovereignty. In fact, the possession of the three major islands in the disputed maritime area 
off and around the coast of the most southerly tip of the Latin American Continent was also the 
main issue. After long conflicts between the two since ????, they finally signed an agreement 
in ???? to submit this issue to a legally binding arbitration without appeal under the auspices 
of Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom. The arbitral tribunal was composed of five 
distinguished members of the ICJ, who were jointly chosen by both parties. The arbitral award 
was unanimously given in favour of Chile in ????, and its contents have been highly appraised by 
many jurists in this field. Dissatisfied with the contents of the award, however, Argentina rejected 
the ruling and even attempted to use force against Chile, challenging the ruling.
In ????, both states agreed upon papal mediation under the Act of Montevideo after direct 
negotiations, but Argentina rejected the Pope’s proposal the following year. After the national 
plebiscite of ????, where more than ??% of the Argentine electorate voted in favour of the 
Vatican’s proposal while around ??% was against this idea, both states signed a protocol of 
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agreement to a treaty at the Vatican City, conceding the disputed islands to Chile but granting more 
maritime rights to Argentina. 
Some writers suggest that this dispute was also connected to the Falklands Islands War. It 
may be said that, in this case, the territorial dispute was solved not as a result of legal justice, but 
rather of political compromise (or a religious miracle). One may even assume that this could only 
have been possible in Catholic countries due to their common cultural and religious backgrounds. 
There is no clear indication of how far religion played a role in this dispute, but it is certain 
that the rigid application and interpretation of the law would not alone have settled the dispute 
definitively.
2. The Cameroon/Nigeria Dispute??
The second example is the land and maritime boundary dispute between Cameroon and 
Nigeria. This territorial dispute is focused on the attribution of sovereignty over the Peninsula of 
Bakassi, which lies in the Gulf of Guinea. After long disputes, Cameroon, who based itself on the 
mutual acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, unilaterally filed the proceedings 
against Nigeria at the ICJ in ????. 
Eight years later, the ICJ rendered a judgment in favour of Cameroon, instructing Nigeria to 
transfer the occupying Peninsula of Bakassi to Cameroon, who, according to this judgement, will 
in turn be obliged to protect the rights of a substantial Nigerian population. The ???? judgment, 
however, invited strong public opinion against it in Nigeria, and its government was under pressure 
to revise it. The danger of armed conflicts and riots became very high. Eventually, in ????, under 
the good offices and mediation by the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, both states agreed 
upon the implementation of the conditions prescribed in the ICJ judgment. Although the transfer 
of the territory in question has not yet been completed, the settlement could not have taken place 
without the then Secretary General’s contribution, backed up by the UN security mechanism as a 
political enforcement system.
3. The 1991 Sino-Russian Border Agreement??
Thirdly, the ???? Sino-Russian Border Agreement also represents a successful settlement of 
a territorial dispute. This long-standing border dispute can also be seen as the product of political 
compromise between China and Russia rather than one of legal principles. After long border 
disputes, both states signed an agreement to settle all the related border disputes that had been 
a legacy of various treaties between the former governments of the two countries. The disputed 
areas stretch as long as ?,???km of the border between the two states, and they include rivers, 
islands, and sandbars. After the conclusion of the agreement and its implementation, by ????, all 
the related disputes have been settled step by step.
The point of this settlement is that both sides did not seek a ‘zero-sum game’ approach, but 
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rather a ‘win-win’ approach, i.e. the ‘fifty-fifty’ approach. In short, both agreed upon the condition 
that they divide the disputed land in the spirit of a ‘fifty-fifty’ approach; while one side concedes 
one item in terms of a land territory, the other admits the opponent’s rights over the other item 
such as the attribution of islands.?? This approach may contain a sense of reaching an equitable, 
if not equal, solution for both parties. Instead of rigorously using the legal rule of Thalweg in 
demarcating the river border, they politically negotiated the deal by way of the technical operation 
of the number and size of the concerned islands. The total balance was struck as a consequence of 
the negotiations, so that both sides could share the feeling of a ‘win-win’ solution through political 
compromise, which may have been in a common interest in the contemporary international 
political environment.
Moreover, a new concept of the ‘joint use’ of some islands in the river was also introduced 
to mitigate the idea that one single country should have full sovereignty over an island despite its 
historic background. These operations of implementing territorial allocation are all conducted for 
the purpose of reaching a ‘mutually acceptable solution’. In this case, political compromise can be 
said to have played a much more significant role than legal principles.
4. Some other cases of interest
Those cases discussed above are all concerned with the territorial disputes between two 
parties. Besides these kinds of bilateral disputes, there are some cases where more than two states 
are involved as the concerned parties of a territorial dispute. It may be noteworthy to briefly 
mention the utility of a mode of settlement of multilateral territorial disputes. The Antarctic 
Treaty of ?????? is a good example of ‘freezing’ the territorial disputes in Antarctica, since its 
fundamental legal principles, including shelving the territorial problem and demilitarisation and 
denuclearisation of the continent, provided the chance for all twelve original signatory parties (i.e. 
seven claimant states, two potential claimant states, and three non-claimant states) to admit each 
party’s legal position. In other words, this is an agreement to disagree to maintain the Antarctic for 
peaceful purposes. Unexpectedly, this miraculous settlement of a region has not come apart so far, 
but has nowadays rather developed into a more sophisticated and organized international ‘objective 
régime’ to govern almost every aspect of the continent.
Another multilateral settlement is the Spitsbergen Treaty of ????,?? which accorded full 
sovereignty over the archipelago to Norway, while it recognized the right to settle citizens of any 
of the signatory states.?? Under this treaty, the islands were partially demilitarised and equal rights 
to engage in industrial activities on the islands are conferred upon all signatory states. Even though 
there may currently be limited use with respect to this classic-style treaty, it had nine original 
signatory parties and has now grown to include more than forty parties.
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Conclusion
 None of the successful examples considered above may be extremely convincing since they 
are completely different from Japan’s territorial disputes in many ways. The author of this article 
might be criticised for these choices and preferences. Obviously, in the case of Japan, the religious 
factor will not work at all, let alone will a person such as the Pope be a very suitable authoritative 
mediator, as was the case with the Beagle Channel dispute. There will practically be no chance to 
go to the ICJ with Russia or the ROK, who would not, in principle, give consent to the proposal. 
As for the case of the boundary dispute between China and Russia, this solution may not apply to 
Japan’s situation because the object of the dispute is completely different in each case: the former 
is principally concerned with the border of the river and the demarcation of land and maritime 
territories, while the latter is mainly related to the attribution of territorial sovereignty over the 
islands.
It should be emphasised, however, that there are some common features in these cases. 
First, there may be limited room for legal principles and rules to work in the settlement of a 
territorial dispute as a whole. Second, no party would generally accept the other side’s contention 
in negotiations. Conversations at a bilateral talk tend to be more or less adversarial even though 
this may be, in most cases, a starting point. The settlement of territorial disputes does not always 
guarantee the implementation by the parties of the judgement of a judicial court or of the award 
of an arbitral tribunal. Third, the settlement of a territorial dispute does not necessarily mean that 
the attribution of sovereignty over a territory is decided through negotiation or another mechanism 
of the dispute settlement, or that the demarcation of boundaries is achieved. These are admirable 
aspects of the resolution process. Laws cannot effectively explain political compromise, but 
international law does not necessarily exclude the applicability of non-legal factors such as ex 
aequo et bono, if necessary. A number of variations of solutions such as joint ownership and 
shelving the dispute for a certain period of time may also be considered as a means to reach a 
‘mutually acceptable solution’, so far as the parties agree.
Japan’s territorial disputes, in principle, contain bilateral questions that need to be solved 
through bilateral talks. It is certainly not possible to settle all the territorial questions at the same 
time in a multilateral frame work. When it comes to a territorial dispute, one cannot but become a 
patriot or a jingoist. Nobody wants to give an inch to anybody. If you gave a finger, then your arm 
would be demanded or even taken. No proposal would be accepted if it were only based on legal 
principles and rules. The facts and data that one side relies upon can be easily challenged, and 
would never be completely accepted, by the other.??
These kinds of deadlock situations would easily lead to a vicious circle fuelled by parochial 
and short-sighted policies. One would enter the tunnel without an end. Under the circumstances 
where a majority of the people of a country cannot calm down and think twice about the future, 
Taisaku Ikeshima
168
and where those people are forced to believe in a myth or an illusion created and emerged through 
mass media and misinformation, it is not easy to reach a practical solution. The significance of a 
solution under law should not be exaggerated. One typical failed example is the South China Sea 
arbitration (The Philippines/China).??
The stress should not be on the omnipotence or omnipotentiality of the law in settling a 
territorial dispute on the basis of its rigorous interpretation and application, but its practical limits 
in the settlement, particularly when more flexible approaches, including Machiavellian intelligence 
and Sun-tzian wisdom, will normally work. Each case is geographically and historically unique. 
A case-by-case approach may not be excluded, since there is no unified rule to settle a territorial 
dispute. Even an ‘Asian way’ may also be applied for good reasons. It may be said that, with 
respect to the territorial disputes in question, there is limited room for the relevant rules of 
international law to function, since most of them are principally of European origin.??
Then a question arises as to whether one should be happy to stick to this stalemate situation 
forever. This is a matter of choice. The longer it takes to settle the dispute, the more difficult it 
becomes. Accomplished facts will accumulate and may easily turn into reality. The future must 
face the consequences of the past’s legacy. Therefore, timing is also key. Diplomacy and law go 
hand in hand in negotiations, and will produce something meaningful only if both find common 
interest in jointly working for their mutual benefit.
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